Forces from Right and Left Involved in Netanyahu's Decision to Release Terrorists

Many people are asking why Netanyahu has made the wildly unpopular decision to release Palestinian murderers and other terrorists from Israeli jails, as well as why the US pressured him to do so.  (For example, Elliott Abrams, here:  http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2013/07/29/why-is-the-united-states-asking-israel-to-release-terrorists/#cid=soc-twitter-at-blogs-why_is_the_united_states_askin-072913)

Here is my entirely speculative guess.  First, Kerry is primarily interested in creating his own legacy.  While he may be peripherally concerned with the best interests of the parties involved, his main goal is to be remembered for something other than the man who lost to George Bush.  As an outside observer, it seems fairly clear to me that he put an extraordinary amount of pressure on Netanyahu to make some concession in order to jump start the process.  

My guess would be, however, that Kerry would not have had a strong preference for prisoner release over settlement freeze.  That pressure (again, I am speculating wildly) probably came from within his coalition.  Can anyone doubt that Nafatli Bennett's HaBayit HaYehudi party would have left the coalition over a settlement freeze?  Bennett has vociferously protested the prisoner release, to be sure, but he has not announced any intention to leave the coaltion over it.  

On the other side, Labor's Shelley Yachimovich bears some responsibility as well.  While she urges Netanyahu not to be "led by the extremists in his government" (http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4410416,00.html) she has vowed to remain in the opposition, thereby forcing Netanyahu, in some cases, to do exactly that which she urges him not to do.  (http://www.timesofisrael.com/as-coalition-forms-yachimovich-vows-to-lead-true-opposition/)  If Yachimovich would join the coalition, Netanyahu would not be beholden to Bennett.  With prospects for peace, while still slim, at least, better than they have been in years, now is the time for Yachimovich and her party to put partisan differences aside and step up to provide Netanyahu with the votes he needs to defy extremists is his coaltion.

UPDATE 8/11/13: As I continue to give this issue a lot of thought, I want to add that, given the choice between a settlement freeze and prisoner release, it is also possible that it was Abbas who picked the prisoner release.  A settlement freeze means nothing is happening.  Abbas has a victory but it is not visual.  There are no pictures of a settlement freeze.  And when the talks fall apart, the building can always resume.

A prisoner release is a much more tangible victory.  Of the 26 prisoners set to be released this week, twelve will go to the West Bank.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/12/us-palestinians-israel-idUSBRE97A06320130812  Abbas will greet these murderers with a hero's welcome, he will hold parades in their honor.  It will be a glorious PR move for Abbas.  And, it is irreversible.  Once released, the prisoners can't be taken back.

So, perhaps it was not Bennett, after all.  

How Are These Negotiations Different from All Other Negotiations?

After several days of rumors and retractions, Secretary Kerry announced this evening that direct talks between "Israelis and Palestinians" were to resume (note how he cleverly avoids using the word "Palestine").

The announcement was greeted with skepticism (as reported here: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/07/19/obama-kerry-middle-east-israel-palestinians/2569373/), and I am pretty skeptical myself.  If Abbas could not accept Olmert's 2008 offer, it is difficult to imagine him accepting anything Netanyahu will offer -- although I do believe Bibi when he says he wants two states for two peoples, it seems highly unlikely that he will offer to give up, for example, sovereignty over the Temple Mount (aka Al-Aqsa Mosque).

But there is one thing that is very different now, and that is, Hamas.  With Hamas's biggest supporters either deposed in Egypt or preoccupied with backing Assad in Syria, Hamas may be in a weaker position than it has been during any previous round of negotiations.  If the real reason that Arafat walked away from Camp David in 2000, and Abbas did the same in 2008, was fear of Hamas -- fear of widespread violence within the Palestinian territories/would-be-state, fear of assassination -- then maybe, just maybe, this weakening of Hamas can allay those fears just enough to give pragmatism and moderation enough edge to carry the day.

There is of course, a host of other reasons the talks can fail, and I am not optimistic.  But there is always hope.